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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
SAMOS PROJECT OFFICE
Air Force Unit Post Office, Los Angeles 45, California

Historical: General

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

7 February 1961

SUBJECT: Reorganization

TO: Secretary of the Air Force (SAFUS)
Washington 25, D. C.

1. In accordance with your request, I am submitting a plan for amalgamating various "Space Programs" under a variant of our current management scheme. It is my intention in this memorandum to state certain informal additional views on the overall problem of enlarging my scope of operation. Two of these are:

a. The current command and program approval channels should be preserved.

b. A certain amount of "focus" on the principal objective will probably be lost.

2. Regarding paragraph 1a, above, it is my understanding that you are contemplating placing the SAFMS office back in the Hq staff in a position generally comparable to the now defunct AFCGM. Such a move would, I believe, be a mistake. The "general staff" philosophy as currently practiced in Hq USAF is incompatible with the objectives of the reorganization. Further, the staff/boards/committees are sufficiently tenacious and influential that in the long run they would overpower, dilute and finally absorb any special management office not placed clearly out of reach. I can only assert from my own experience that even assigning it directly to the Chief of Staff will not solve the problem. I realize this is a damaging indictment of the general staff system as we in the Air Force use it. It is my view that it does certain jobs very well -- those associated with supporting and operating a massive set of weapons systems whose principal objectives are being always ready to fight and win a war tomorrow morning. On the more subtle tasks associated with staying in the forefront of the lead-time race in science and technology and more particularly on those tasks relating to special operations of systems never intended to become operational in the classical sense, the Hq USAF general staff system is in my view unacceptably cumbersome. Since it seems impossible to reorganize from within, and there have been about ten attempts in ten years, it follows that reorganization of certain key elements by what is essentially a flanking operation is necessary. At least it is highly desirable to experiment with new approaches. In a fundamental sense the current proposal before the house will, if consummated, constitute a major reorganization by the simple process of creating a new structure essentially outside the old.

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In this context I favor the reorganization. May I reiterate however that I believe it unwise to tie into the normal Hq staff directly. Such a move would make the experiment short lived.

3. Regarding paragraph 1b, above, I understand the purpose(s) of enlarging the scope of SAFSP and I further concede that a case can be made which says that if I address myself to problems in their proper order of priority I should not lose focus on the important elements of the program. Practically, however, I believe that the sheer labor of sorting out such problems as the extensive Transit ground net work, the unraveling of the administrative snarl now existing for the Advent program, the administration involved in absorbing disimilar programs such as SAINT, Vela Hotel, etc., will inevitably cause my eye to wander occasionally from the main effort. There may be a net gain over a period of time accruing from those matters which can be listed as advantages inherent in the new proposed grouping. I further recognize that some such move as that proposed may in fact be mandatory for reasons which override some of the inherent disadvantages. My intent here is to express mild concern over certain obvious problem areas. It is not my intent to even faintly imply that I will be overwhelmed by the proposed broadened responsibilities.

4. Of the several organizational schemes which could have been proposed for my office, I have chosen the simplest and most straightforward. Rather than attempt a complete self sufficient organization with Comptroller, Personnel, etc., I have chosen to recommend a grouping of the major "mission elements" under SAFSP leaving support to BMD. By assuming control of the key management elements, including budget of course, it should be possible to effectively direct and control the overall operation. The degree to which I have recommended support from outside is possibly debatable. Certainly, if there is lack of cooperation from any support agency, I can get in trouble quickly. It may be necessary with time to ask for more support elements in order to keep my authority commensurate with my responsibility. On balance, however, I believe that what I am recommending is the best phase I starting position. In this context I think it is necessary to again point out that it will be very essential that BMC support my operation with the right numbers and kinds of persons physically for duty here at El Segundo. Program Directors can not deal effectively with contractors without the constant assistance and advice of legally constituted contracting officers. The Program Director/Contracting Officer form a close nit team for fast-moving R&D programs. This is fundamental; this is why physical collocation in my view is almost mandatory.

5. I await the outcome of your next move with interest!

ROBERT E. GREER
Brigadier General, USAF
Director of SAMOS Project

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

As a result of the Presidential review and direction in August 1960, the SAMOS project was reoriented into a program of very high priority and placed under a special streamlined management structure. Since that time, several factors have arisen which make imperative the immediate establishment of a new understanding concerning the management of the entire national satellite reconnaissance effort. These factors are:

1. Key personnel have changed, and with the change, the full impact of the original SAMOS management philosophy has been obscured. Some of the SAMOS changes were originally established by verbal instruction, some by written, though purposely incomplete, vague or misleading directives; all were unequivocally understood by key personnel at the time the changes were made. The meaning of these changes is now sought in words which were written merely to confirm understandings while preserving security and outward appearances of this sensitive subject. A complete understanding must be reached with new key personnel as to the full intent behind the special SAMOS management structure, and their full and complete support obtained for this concept. In addition, some further actions must be taken to alleviate problems reflected in the following paragraphs:

2. Problems of mapping and geodesy have complicated the subject of satellite reconnaissance and presently threaten to expand greatly the number of people and agencies involved in management of these projects. This problem has arisen as follows: The covert mapping project ARGON uses the same overt cover as the CORONA project, and competes with it for vehicle and launch pads, although these projects are managed quite differently. In addition to complications due to the involved project management structure, two relatively recent mapping factors have considerable impact upon the reconnaissance program:

a. Recently it has been generally agreed that the use of reconnaissance photography together with the mapping photography obtained from satellites will enable the production of higher quality maps with significant increase in accuracy. This means that the results of both SAMOS and CORONA will be used with ARGON and other proposed satellite mapping results to produce geodetic and mapping products. It also means that full consideration must be given to the possible contribution of expected reconnaissance photography in the establishment of mapping and geodesy projects and selection of their technical characteristics. This will require a close coupling of these two types of projects, and may include some vehicles which carry both reconnaissance and mapping payloads simultaneously.

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b. The assignment of satellite mapping and geodesy responsibilities separately from satellite reconnaissance responsibilities results in two different major Departments becoming necessarily involved in both fields. The resulting complex management structure for such mapping and geodesy projects weakens the streamlined reconnaissance management structure and greatly expands the personnel who have knowledge of sensitive reconnaissance program matters. A current example is the presently proposed establishment of the TOMAS/VAULT mapping and geodesy project to be managed by the Army through combined use of Army agencies and detailed tasking of Air Force agencies. The current study of the details of implementing this proposed program by a Tri-Service Reconnaissance, Mapping and Geodesy Working Group is exposing reconnaissance program detail to many people not involved in reconnaissance management.

3. The regular flight of SAMOS vehicles presents problems in regard to political considerations of reconnaissance in peace time. With the approach of the flight phase of this acknowledged reconnaissance project, international incidents and situations have contributed to a substantial increase in the political vulnerability of the program. This vulnerability includes all overt over-flight photography for reconnaissance, mapping and geodesy as well as electronic signal collection. To cope effectively with this situation, close coordination must be maintained between overt and covert projects, and all conducted under a management characterized by high discipline and quick response to national direction. The establishment of effective means to cope with the political vulnerability problem is greatly impeded by the different management structure and variety of agencies and offices being employed in each of the affected and related projects. A close relationship must be established between the technical program control of all such projects and public information policy. A better method must be developed to handle public informational aspects of all satellite test programs if the covert missions of many satellites are to be protected from compromise. This means that a public information and technical program control policy must be developed for sensitive satellites, and the same policy applied uniformly to other non-sensitive satellites in order to provide the necessary protection.

The following actions will correct the situation described above if decisively implemented:

1. Management of all satellite photographic and electronic signal collection projects to be placed under a single streamlined authoritative management structure, as the National Satellite Reconnaissance Program.

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2. The National Satellite Reconnaissance Program to be responsive only to photographic and electronic signal collection requirements and priorities as established by the USIB (COMSR).

3. All projects within the Program to be placed under a single security control system.

4. Results of all projects in this National Program to be made available to users as designated by the USIB (COMSR). Appropriate collection system characteristics to be included where required for the production of maps.

5. All photographic data resulting from this program to be chemically processed in the same organizational manner.

6. The management of the National Satellite Reconnaissance Program to be given authority and support required to effectively cope with the political vulnerability problem, including overt actions as required. A uniform public information policy to be developed on the basis of reconnaissance, mapping and geodesy satellites and applied uniformly to other less sensitive satellite projects.

7. Every effort to be made to avoid publicity of this re-direction to the maximum practicable extent.

POSSIBLE SOLUTION

A possible solution to the management problems outlined above is illustrated in the chart entitled "Single Management for all Satellite Reconnaissance." Its overt appearance would be based upon the SAMOS management, the broad aspects of which have been publicly disclosed. This structure is illustrated in Fig. A of the referenced chart, and would be supplemented by overt unclassified and classified directives, the net effect of which would be to place all satellite reconnaissance, mapping and geodesy projects under the Air Force within the management structure already established for SAMOS. The original SAMOS management concept would be re-affirmed for all satellite reconnaissance, mapping and geodesy projects. Key elements of the DOD staff would be kept informed on the status of these projects but would exercise no direct project control or supervision.

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The above steps would provide adequate cover for the actual situation, which is quite different from the apparent situation, illustrated in Fig. B of the referenced chart. The Secretary of Defense, on a covert basis, would designate the Under Secretary of the Air Force as his Special Assistant for Satellite Reconnaissance, and delegate to him the authority for management of this program, so that the Under Secretary would act as the direct representative of the Secretary of Defense, both within and outside the Department of Defense. (Key personnel would be cleared for and briefed on this arrangement in the same manner as that employed for covert project briefings.)

By agreement between the Director of the CIA and the Secretary of Defense, the National Satellite Reconnaissance Office would be established covertly. The office would consist of a Director and a Deputy Director, each with a very small special staff, the combined total of which would not be more than twenty personnel. The Under Secretary of the Air Force would hold one of these positions, and the Deputy Director, Plans of CIA would hold the other.

The NSRO would not have a single office for either the Director and Deputy Director, or the Special Staff. The office would not direct anything as an office; the actions taken would be through the authority which the Director and Deputy hold over their respective agencies, through authority which has been delegated to them from the heads of their agencies. The NSRO would provide a formalized method of effecting a close-knit coordination of the CIA and the DOD, and would greatly enhance the harmonious division of project responsibilities between them.

Combination of the CIA and the DOD in this manner would permit the special features of both to be effectively welded into a single streamlined management structure. The Air Force, as the agent of the Secretary of Defense, would be responsible for program approvals, R&D management, technical reviews, scheduling, financial management, and overt contract administration. The CIA would be responsible for target programming of each vehicle, program communication, program security, and covert contract administration. The actual management procedures would be worked out in detail by the Director and Deputy Director of the NSRO.

In the field, the Director of the SAMOS project would covertly be designated Director of Satellite Reconnaissance Systems. He would work directly with field units of the CIA as approved by the NSRO. By establishing a suitable joint field office, all contracts in the program would be brought under a single, effective coordinated review and control. All projects in the program would be placed under a single security control

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system administered by the CIA. All photographic results would be chemically processed under the present overt/covert arrangements between the Air Force Satellite Photographic Processing Laboratory and Eastman Kodak Company.

This solution would enable the special covert contracting authority and security experience of the CIA to be combined effectively with the technical, managerial, and operational capabilities and resources of the Air Force to conduct the National Satellite Reconnaissance Program in a manner fully responsive to the problems of this program and to the national urgency of its objectives.

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ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION

The solution described above provides an effective method of centering responsibility for the streamlined management of the National Reconnaissance Satellite Program in two persons, responsible in turn to their respective agencies. It provides a workable method of coupling the CIA and the DOD, without confusing or overlapping responsibilities. It does not, however, center all responsibility for this program in a single person. The following discussion of a possible alternate solution is addressed to the consideration of such a single person designation.

The National Satellite Reconnaissance Program cannot be conducted entirely by either the CIA or the DOD. The CIA could not carry out the massive overt activities that are required without giving away the security of covert operations. The nature of the DOD organization and methods of operation preclude the effective exploitation of a large scale covert program over any substantial time period. Because of the interaction with the CIA in intelligence data analysis and requirements, an intimate working relationship with this Agency is essential. In addition, the freedoms of operation that the CIA enjoys can greatly enhance the establishment and conduct of covert reconnaissance efforts.

The only way that a single person could be given complete program responsibility would be to designate a CIA official having line responsibility and authority in that Agency to simultaneously be an official in DOD also exercising line responsibility and authority in the name of the Secretary of Defense, and charged with responsibility for the complete program. This official would be Director of the NSRO and would direct CIA activities through his line responsibility and authority in that Agency, and direct DOD activities through his responsibility and authority in DOD. The Under Secretary of the Air Force would be Deputy Director of the NSRO, and actions to Air Force units would be through him. With these changes, this covert solution would appear the same as shown in the chart for the previously described solution. Its overt appearance would be identical with the other solution.

This solution would center responsibility in one person, rather than two, but it would require him to be responsible simultaneously to two supervisors.

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EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING;
DOD DIR. 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

SUMMARY OF PROGRAMS

SAMOS is the satellite reconnaissance program publicly acknowledged to be under development. It is handled by direct management from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Air Force to the General Officer in the field known as the Director of the SAMOS project. All project review and approval actions are on single line between the Secretary of the Air Force and the field Director. There are a total of 20 photographic flights currently scheduled and a total of eight electronic signal collection flights. In addition, electronic signal collection piggyback packages are currently scheduled in other satellite vehicles. Next flight is an E-2 (20 ft. resolution readout system) on 8 August. First recovery E-5 (5 ft. resolution) is scheduled Nov 61.

CORONA - The CORONA program is jointly managed by the CIA and the Air Force. The Air Force is responsible for the overt DISCOVERER activities and jointly supports the CIA in the covert activities. The Under Secretary of the Air Force has established direct communications on a project level for appropriate management actions. Payload procurement included 12 C cameras, 11 C' cameras (plus 3 spares), 6 C''' cameras (plus 2 qualification cameras). There remain 5 C' flight articles and 6 C''' flight articles.

MURAL is a joint CIA-Air Force managed program. The Under Secretary of the Air Force and the CIA have established a joint management and contracting arrangement for total program control. Using the 2 C''' qualification articles, an engineering flight is scheduled for Jan of 62. Five operational flights (10 cameras) are scheduled for summer of 1962.

ARGON - The ARGON program is jointly managed by DDR&E(OSD), the Under Secretary of the Air Force, and the CIA. The Air Force is responsible for vehicle and overt activities, CIA is responsible for covert contracting, and the DDR&E (including U. S. Army) is responsible for the operational aspects. There are six flight cameras (plus two spares) provided in this program. There are three flight articles (plus one spare) remaining. Next flight is scheduled for 21 July 61. DDR&E has directed that a 7th flight be scheduled using the presently available spare camera, and that four additional cameras be procured. The 7th flight plus the four additional flight cameras require $8.1 million not yet made available. The earliest a 7th flight could be scheduled is 12 months from go ahead (Agena vehicle is pacing item).

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TOSSIS/VAULT - This is a proposed program now under extensive study. Department of Defense has directed, in accordance with 28 March DOD Directive 5200.34 and several subsequent memoranda, that Department of the Army be responsible for the over-all program. Just how this can be done is presently the subject of an intensive study by a Tri-Service Working Group on Reconnaissance, Mapping, and Geodesy. The Army proposes that the Air Force procure vehicle, provide launch and on-orbit operation and recovery of the end product. The Department of the Army would contract and manage the program by detailed tasking of some Air Force capabilities. The Army proposes to process the end product. DDR&E has directed that this program be oriented toward a 1964 operational period.

SAMOS I-A - The SAMOS Project I-A was initiated in Nov 1960, based upon the 412 camera which is an applied research outgrowth of the ARPA-cancelled SAMOS E-4 program. This was made possible as a result of the launch vehicles being made available from the Presidential review of the SAMOS program in Aug 60 and the status of the camera in the Air Force research program. There were scheduled three flights in calendar year 1962 with provisions for a possible follow-on of five flights in calendar year 1963. On 1 June DDR&E directed the Air Force to limit this project to procurement of four cameras, and to delete all planned flight schedules. There are no flights planned at the present time. The earliest that a flight could be scheduled is April 1962.

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LAUNCH SCHEDULE



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

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

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~~SPECIAL HANDLING~~ **MURAL** **DISCOVERER**



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DISCOVERER

EXPLOITATION | MANAGEMENT | SUPPORT



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

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SINGLE MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

NOTE: The National Satellite Reconnaissance Program responds only to photographic and signal collection requirements of the USIB (COMAR)



* *Director is assigned to Secy AF, maintains field extension office at AFSSD, also serves as Vice Commander, AFSSD.*

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